Proposal for a fully decentralized blockchain and proof-of-work
  algorithm for solving NP-complete problems by Oliver, Carlos G. et al.
Proposal for a fully decentralized blockchain and proof-of-work algorithm for solving
NP-complete problems∗
Carlos G. Oliver†
School of Computer Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
Alessandro Ricottone and Pericles Philippopoulos
Department of Physics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
(Dated: September 5, 2017)
Abstract We propose a proof-of-work algorithm that
rewards blockchain miners for using computational re-
sources to solve NP-complete puzzles. The resulting
blockchain will publicly store and improve solutions to
problems with real world applications while maintaining
a secure and fully functional transaction ledger.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread success of cryptocurrency platforms
such as Bitcoin [1], Ethereum [2] has attracted a substan-
tial amount of computational resources [3]. However, the
majority of this computing power is destined for execut-
ing proof-of-work algorithms (for example, the Bitcoin
hashrate is over four exahash per second [4]). While
proof-of-work algorithms are highly reliable, the informa-
tion generated by mining does not extend beyond guar-
anteeing the validity of the information on the network.
In this work, we aim to design a new mining paradigm
that diverts some of the computational resources from
mining to solving problems with real world applications
while simultaneously maintaining a secure blockchain.
We focus on the class of problems known as NP-
complete problems. Such problems are most readily ap-
plied to blockchain systems because they possess the im-
portant property that the solution to the problem can be
verified in polynomial time, while identifying the solution
in the first place has no known polynomial algorithm.
One of the first systems to attempt such a paradigm
was Primecoin [5], which in 2013 proposed that users
devote their computational power towards finding spe-
cific chains of prime numbers instead of cryptographic
mining. While the identification of prime numbers is of
interest generally, technical limitations force the coin to
solve for a specific type of prime number whose scientific
impact is not clear at the moment. Other blockchains
such as the CureCoin [6] (previously known as Foldcoin)
and Coinami [7] have attempted to solve bioinformat-
ics problems which are of more direct impact. However,
both systems depend on a central authority to delegate
the problems and validate the identity of users who must
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register. We therefore aim at developing a cryptocur-
rency that addresses these shortcomings while still re-
liably acting as a trusted distributed ledger. The key
components we aim to implement are:
• Full decentralization
• Anonymity
• Generation of solutions to practical problems
By proposing a novel mining and incentive protocol to
the established Bitcoin framework, we believe we have
achieved a system that satisfies all of the above features.
II. BLOCKCHAIN
The proposed blockchain is based closely on the well
established Bitcoin blockchain protocol, with one key dif-
ference: miners are rewarded for solving an NP-complete
problem via a mining difficulty reduction. The idea is
that miners, after building a block are allowed to choose
between submitting a block mined using the standard
Bitcoin protocol (see [1]) by finding a valid nonce, or
if they have computed an improved solution to an NP-
complete problem can publish it along with their block
which would be verified and accepted by the network at
a reduced difficulty.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
blockchain will deal with a single instance of a given NP-
complete problem, we call this problem P . For example,
if the NP-complete problem were finding a graph color-
ing (GC) of a graph g of size less than some current best
k, the blockchain would only work on that specific g and
P := (g, k). In Section III we discuss ways to incorpo-
rate a greater number of instances of the problem. The
only requirement for a problem to be used in the proof-
of-work is that verifying a solution to the problem can be
accomplished in polynomial time with a clearly defined
scoring scheme.
A. Block structure
Blocks are structured identically to Bitcoin blocks (i.e.
Transaction Merkle Root, miner address, nonce, etc.),
with the addition of a new field for storing the problem,
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2P . The genesis block is special in that it contains a field
that stores the initial problem state. For example, if
the blockchain is to solve the Traveling Salesman Prob-
lem (TSP), the block will simply store the graph to be
worked on. Typically such problems can be compactly
represented in matrix form.
Subsequent blocks contain a field that stores a com-
pact representation of a solution. In the case of TSP,
this would be a vector with the index of visited nodes.
However, not all blocks are forced to contribute a solu-
tion to the given problem, and this field is allowed to take
on a null value that indicates that the miner produced
the block normally.
B. Incentivization
The main task a Bitcoin miner has to accomplish in
order to produce a valid block once he has obtained a
set of valid transactions is to find a valid nonce, n. More
specifically, miners need to find an integer n such that
H(B,n) < d, (1)
where H(B,n) is the hash function applied to block B
and n, and d is the target associated with difficulty d.
Because H is a cryptographic hash function, the output
of H is completely unpredictable, therefore mining con-
sists of brute forcing values of n until the condition is
satisfied. Clearly an d with smaller d is easier to satisfy
than the inverse. Once a miner finds a valid nonce they
can publish the block along with the n and the network
can easily verify the validity of the block according to the
network’s current difficulty d. Because mining is a com-
petitive endeavor, we reward miners that compute solu-
tions to P by reducing mining difficulty. In our protocol,
miners will accept blocks that satisfy a reduced difficulty
dr constraint if the block contains a solution that is bet-
ter than the current best solution on the blockchain. If
the average time needed to mine a block with a solution
is shorter than the average time needed to mine a block
without, we expect miners to spend their computational
power in improving the solution to the problem.
C. Mining & Difficulty Scaling
In Bitcoin, the hashing difficulty is retargetted every
N (= 2016) blocks, by comparing the time it took to
mine these blocks, T ?, to a target time T . In the pro-
posed blockchain, we have two different difficulties which
must each be retargetted. These difficulties are db, for
blocks mined without a solution to problem P , and dr,
a reduced difficulty for blocks mined with a solution to
problem P . For the retargetting of both difficulties to
be accomplished, a value for T must be fixed by the
blockchain, as is the case for Bitcoin. However, we must
also establish the constant 0 < η < 1, which represents
the desired ratio of time it takes to mine a block with a
solution to problem P , ts, to the time it takes to mine a
block without a solution to problem P , tb. A smaller η
would result in a greater incentive for puzzle solutions to
be found.
We define t?s to be the average time it took to mine
a block with a solution to problem P and t?b to be the
average time it took to mine a block without a solution
to problem P . We can thus write these two quantities as
t?s =
dr
pH
+
dp
pH
, (2)
t?b =
db
pH
, (3)
where pH is the rate at which computations can be per-
formed by the network, and dp is the difficulty associated
with solving the problem P . We expect dp to increase
with time as better and better solutions to problem P are
found. We also define the measured quantity, η? = t?s/t
?
b
and b, the fraction of blocks mined with base difficulty
db. Using Eqs. (2) and (3),
η? =
dr + dp
db
. (4)
The goal, after N blocks, is to set dr and db to new
values d′r and d
′
b so that the time it takes to mine the
N blocks, T ?, under fixed pH , dp and b, readjusts to-
wards the target T and η? readjusts towards η. We can
therefore write
T ? =
N
pH
db [b+ (1− b)η?] , (5)
T =
N
pH
d′b [b+ (1− b)η] . (6)
Solving these equations for the retargetted base difficulty
yields,
d′b = db
[
b+ (1− b)η?
b+ (1− b)η
]
T
T ?
. (7)
To retarget dr we use the fact that the difficulties
should be updated so that
η =
d′r + dp
d′b
. (8)
We note that dp is not retargetted to d
′
p as it is com-
pletely determined by the status of the problem P . Com-
bining Eq. (8) with Eqs. (2) and (3), we can write
d′r − dr = ηd′b − η?db. (9)
Thus, Eqs. (7) and (9) display the rules for the diffi-
culty retargetting of the proposed blockchain. As with
the Bitcoin blockchain, it would be advisable to intro-
duce a maximum retargetting factor (4 for the Bitcoin
chain) to avoid a change in difficulty that is too abrupt.
In other words, we would enforce
31
4
≤ d
′
b
db
≤ 4. (10)
After P has become too difficult to improve, it is possi-
ble that dp > db. This implies that the updated difficulty
d′r becomes negative at which point it would be necessary
to introduce a new problem P to work on. We discuss
how this can be implemented in Section III. However,
at the point when it is no longer worthwhile to solve the
puzzle, the blockchain naturally functions with db and
the standard Bitcoin proof-of-work.
D. Possible Puzzles
There is a wealth of interesting NP-complete problems
that could be used as puzzles for the blockchain. Here
we suggest a list, which is by no means exhaustive, of
possible applications:
• Multiple Sequence Alignment: many databases
with DNA sequence information are widely avail-
able (e.g. [8]). The problem of improving aligned
multiple DNA sequences is NP-complete and has
many applications in biology and medicine.
• Protein/biomolecule folding and design: com-
puting the 2D and 3D geometry of chains of
DNA/RNA/Protein as well as designing sequences
with desired geometries. Many databases for this
problem are also available, e.g. Protein Data Bank
[9]. Solutions so this problem can have direct med-
ical applications.
• Ising-lattice: The decision form of the Ising model
(to decide whether the ground state of an Ising
Hamiltonian has energy E ≤ 0) is NP-complete
[10] and it can be mapped to many other NP-
complete problems. These models are widely stud-
ied in physics.
III. MULTIPLE-PUZZLE BLOCKCHAIN
Clearly a blockchain that only works on a single prob-
lem, P will quickly exhaust its usefulness. Ideally, we
would want the blockchain to simultaneously solve a set
Ω ⊆ Ωj of instances of an NP-complete problem j, where
i is an index over all possible NP-complete problems,
j ∈ {GC,TSP, . . . }, and Ωj contains all possible NP-
complete problems of type j. While we leave the specifics
of how this can be achieved to future work, here we dis-
cuss some of the challenges and potential solutions.
A. Puzzle Storage
Because we wish to have full decentralization, Ω must
be stored on the blockchain. This can be achieved in
one of two manners. If the size of Ω is small enough
to be stored by all the miners, the genesis block could
simply be used to store an indexed database of Ω. Sub-
sequent blocks that contain solutions to a problem P ∈ Ω
would simply include with their solution a pointer to the
corresponding problem in the genesis block. If Ω is too
large for all the miners to store, the network could in-
stead allow some nodes to participate as ‘storage’ nodes
and collect a reward for doing so in a manner similar to
file storage coins [11]. The main blockchain would then
simply contain pointers to the relevant problem for each
block (Fig. 1, lower half).
B. Puzzle Selection
In the single-puzzle blockchain, miners always work on
the same problem. In the multiple-puzzle setting there
must be a protocol for selecting the problem for the cur-
rent block. The most natural approach is to allow miners
to submit a solution to any P ∈ Ω they choose for a re-
duced difficulty. This has the advantage of potentially
maximizing the network’s efficiency in solving problems
if miners work on non-overlapping regions of Ω. However,
if one wishes to force some distribution on the frequency
that each puzzle gets included in a block, one could use
the hash of the previous block to determine the index j of
the current admissible puzzle, Pi ∈ Ω. (Fig. 1, upper
half) Such a function could be augmented for example
to favor problems not yet been included and suppress
problems that have been worked on too much.
C. New Puzzles
Eventually (unless Ω is very large), all puzzles will
reach some plateau of optimality and further compu-
tation will not produce significant gains. The obvious
solution to this situation is to allow the blockchain to
incorporate new problems into Ω. The challenge is to
manage new puzzle incorporation without a central au-
thority that ensures problems are: 1) valid instances of
j 2) of interest 3) not already solved. New puzzles can
be included as a special transaction. This transaction
can store the problem in the current block, or add it to
the storage nodes. To discourage puzzles that do not sat-
isfy the three criteria, new problems should be submitted
with a fee which is then distributed as a reward to min-
ers that solve the puzzle. Alternatively, the network can
agree on a new problem set off-chain and in a manner
similar to Bitcoin, induce a fork or upgrade of the chain
that includes a new agreed upon problem set.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have outlined the major components of a cryp-
tocurrency system that incentivizes the identification of
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FIG. 1. Potential blockchain architecture for handling multiple puzzles. Problem set Ω is stored in independent storage nodes
with addresses S1 and S2 (lower left) that sync to the main blockchain (top). Worker nodes N1, N2, N3, that mine coins and
solve puzzles request puzzle data from the storage nodes. The index(es) i of the admissible puzzle(s) for block Bt+1 are obtained
from the hash of the block H(Bt), which is also contained in Bt+1. The hash-determined problem index is an optional feature
and can be omitted if the blockchain allows any problem solution to be accepted at any time. Once a miner has successfully
mined a block with transactions Tx by finding a valid nonce n and puzzle solution wt+1 he publishes the block to the network.
solutions to scientifically interesting problems without re-
lying on any central authorities or servers. The benefit
of using this proposed blockchain instead of other proof-
of-work blockchains is twofold. A portion of the power
expended on hashing is redirected to solving problems
that are scientifically relevant. And second, solutions to
these problems are naturally stored and updated in the
blockchain for public access. To our knowledge, this is
the first blockchain solution that achieves these features
in a fully decentralized manner. The implementation of
this system is left for future work.
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